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ABSTRACT
We study security-bid auctions in which bidders compete by bidding with securities whose payments
are contingent on the realized value of the asset being sold. Such auctions are commonly used, both
formally and informally. In formal auctions, the seller restricts bids to an ordered set, such as an
equity share or royalty rate, and commits to a format, such as first or second-price. In informal
settings with competing buyers, the seller does not commit to a mechanism upfront. Rather, bidders
offer securities and the seller chooses the most attractive bid, based on his beliefs, ex-post. 
We characterize equilibrium payoffs and bidding strategies for formal and informal auctions. For
formal auctions, we examine the impact of both the security design and the auction format. We
define a notion of the steepness of a set of securities, and show that steeper securities lead to higher
revenues. We also show that the revenue equivalence principle holds for equity and cash auctions,
but that it fails for debt (second-price auctions are superior) and for options (a first-price auction
yields higher revenues). We then show that an informal auction yields the lowest possible revenues
across all possible formal mechanisms. Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the effects of
liquidity constraints, different information assumptions, and aspects of moral hazard.
Peter M. DeMarzo












Auction theory and its applications have become increasingly important as an area of 
economic research over the last twenty years. As a result, we now have a better 
understanding of how the structure of an auction affects its outcome.  Almost all the 
existing literature studies the case when bidders use cash payments, so that the value of a 
bid is not contingent on future events.  
In a few cases, such as art auctions, the realized value is subjective and cannot be used as 
a basis for payment; however, this is the exception.  In many important applications, the 
realization of the future cash flow generated by the auctioned asset or project can be used 
in determining the actual payment. That is, the bids can be securities whose values are 
derived from the future cash flow.  We call this setting a security-bid auction, and 
provide an extensive characterization of such auctions. 
Formal auctions of this type are commonly used in government sales of oil leases, 
wireless spectrum, highway building contracts, and lead-plaintiff auctions.  Informal 
auctions of this type (in the sense that formal auction rules are not set forth in advance) 
are common in the private sector.  Examples include authors selling publishing rights, 
entrepreneurs selling their firm to an acquirer or soliciting venture capital, and sports 
associations selling broadcasting rights.
1  
The major difference between a formal and an informal mechanism is the level of 
commitment by the seller. In an informal mechanism, bidders choose which securities to 
offer, and the seller selects the most attractive offer ex-post. In this case, the auction 
contains the elements of a signaling game because the seller may infer bidders’ private 
information from their security choices when evaluating their offers. In a formal 
mechanism the seller restricts bidders to use securities from a pre-specified ordered set, 
such as an equity share or royalty rate. The seller is committed to disqualify any offer 
outside this set. The seller also commits to an auction format, such as a first or second-
price auction. One of our main results is that the revenues from an informal mechanism 
are the lowest across a large set of possible mechanisms. In other words, the seller 
benefits from any form of commitment.  Moreover, we show how to rank security 
designs and auction formats in terms of their impact on the seller’s revenues and that the 
design of the securities can be more important than design of the auction itself. 
In our model, several agents compete for the right to undertake a project that requires an 
upfront investment. Bidders are endowed with private signals regarding the value they 
can expect from the project. Our initial structure is similar to an independent private 
values model, so that different bidders expect different payoffs upon winning, though we 
also consider correlated and common values. The model differs from standard auction 
                                                           
1 See Hendricks and Porter (1988) for a discussion of oil lease auctions, in which royalty rates are 
commonly used. In wireless spectrum auctions, the bids are effectively debt securities (leading in some 
cases to default).  Highway building contracts are often awarded through “build, operate, and transfer” 
agreements to the bidder that offers to charge the lowest toll for a pre-specified period.  See Fisch (2001) 
for the use of contingency-fee auctions in the selection of the lead plaintiff in class action suits.  In mergers, 
acquisitions and venture capital agreements, equity and other securities are commonly used (see Martin 
(1996)). McMillan (1991) describes the auction of the broadcast rights to the Olympic games, where bids 
contained revenue-sharing clauses. Similarly, publishing contracts include advance and royalty payments.   2
models, in that bids are securities. Bidders offer derivatives in which the underlying value 
is the future payoff of the project.  Because the winner may make investments or take 
other actions that affect this future payoff, we also discuss the possibility of moral hazard.  
One might conjecture that the results from standard auction theory carry over to security-
bid auctions by simply replacing each security with its cash value. However, unlike cash 
bids, the value of a security bid depends upon the bidder’s private information. This 
difference can have important consequences as the following simple example 
demonstrates:  
Consider an auction in which two bidders, Alice and Bob, compete for a project. 
The project requires an initial fixed investment that is equivalent to $1M. Alice 
expects that if she undertakes the project then on average it would yield revenues 
of $3M; Bob expects that future revenues will equal only $2M.  Hence, Alice sees 
a profit of $2M while Bob sees a profit of $1M. Assuming these estimates are 
private values, in a standard second-price auction it is a dominant strategy for 
bidders to bid their reservation values. As a result, Alice would win the auction 
and pay Bob’s bid, $1M.  
Now suppose that rather than bidding with cash, the bidders compete by offering 
a fraction of the future revenues. As we later discuss, it is again a dominant 
strategy for bidders to bid their reservation values. Alice offers 2/3 of future 
revenues while Bob offers 1/2. As a result, Alice wins the auction and pays 
according to Bob’s bid; that is, she gives up one-half of the future revenues.  This 
yields a higher payoff for the auctioneer; (1/2)×$3M = $1.5M > $1M.      
This example is based on Hansen (1985), who was the first to examine the use of 
securities in an auction setting.  Hansen showed that a second-price equity auction yields 
higher expected revenues than a cash-based auction.  In a related paper, Riley (1988) 
considers first-price auctions where bids include royalty payments in addition to cash.  
He shows that adding the royalty increases expected revenues.  The intuition in both 
cases is that adding an equity component to the bid lowers the difference between the 
winner’s valuation and that of the second highest bidder.  Because this difference is the 
rent captured by the winner, reducing it benefits the seller. 
In this paper, we generalize this insight along several dimensions.  First, we consider a 
general class of securities that includes debt, equity or royalty rates, options, and hybrids 
of these.  Second, we consider alternative auction formats (e.g., first-price vs. second-
price).  Third, we consider informal auctions, in which the seller cannot commit to an 
auction mechanism in advance. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The basic model is described in Section 2.  We 
begin our analysis in Section 3 by examining formal mechanisms, which consist of both 
an auction format and a security design.  There we establish the following results: 
•  We characterize super-modularity conditions under which a monotone – and 
hence efficient – equilibrium is the unique outcome for the first and second-price 
auctions. 
•  First we compare security designs holding fixed the auction format (first or 
second-price).  We show that for either format, the seller’s expected revenues are   3
positively related to the “steepness” (a notion that we define) of the securities.  As 
a result, debt contracts minimize the seller’s expected payoffs while call options 
maximize it.  This result generalizes the observations of Hansen (1985) and Riley 
(1988). 
•  Fixing the security design, we then consider the role of the auction format.  We 
define two important classes of sets of securities: sub-convex and super-convex 
sets  For sub-convex sets – which include, for example, the set of debt securities – 
we show that a second-price auction yields higher expected revenues than a first-
price auction. Alternatively, if the set is super-convex (e.g., call options), the 
reverse conclusion holds and first-price auctions are superior.  However, we find 
the effect of the auction format to be small relative to the security design. 
•  We then ask whether the Revenue Equivalence principle for cash auctions, which 
states that expected revenues are independent of the auction format, can be 
extended to security bid auctions.  We show it holds if the ordered set of securities 
is convex.  This is true for important classes of securities, such as equity.  
•  Finally we combine these results to show that the first-price auction with call 
options maximizes the seller’s revenue, while the first-price format with debt 
minimizes it, over a general set of auction mechanisms. 
In the second part of the paper (Section 4), we consider the case in which the seller is 
unable to commit ex-ante to a formal auction mechanism. Instead he accepts all bids and 
chooses the security that is optimal ex-post. Though often not labeled as “auctions” 
because they lack a formal mechanism, we believe that these informal auctions represent 
the vast majority of auction-like activity in practice, since in most transactions the seller 
is unable to commit to a decision rule ex-ante.  As mentioned above, in this case the task 
of selecting the winning bid is not trivial; it involves a signaling game in which the seller 
uses his beliefs to rank the different securities and choose the most attractive one. Our 
main result is as follows: 
•  In the unique equilibrium satisfying standard refinements of off-equilibrium 
beliefs, bidders use only debt securities. Moreover, the outcome is equivalent to a 
first-price auction. As a result we conclude that this ex-post maximization yields 
the worst possible outcome for the seller!  
The intuition is that debt provides the cheapest way for a high type to signal his quality. 
Thus, bidders find it optimal to compete using debt. 
Section 5 extends the model by considering the effects of: relaxing liquidity constraints, 
moral hazard regarding the bidder’s investment, reservation prices, and the introduction 
of affiliated as well as common values.  We demonstrate that the main insights of our 
analysis carry over to these settings.  For example, we show that: 
•  If the bidder’s investment in the project is unverifiable and subject to moral 
hazard, then it is not optimal for the seller to offer cash compensation to the 
winner for this investment. 
•  Combining cash payments with bids effectively “flattens” the bids and reduces 
the expected revenues of the seller.   4
•  Our conclusions regarding the revenue consequences of the security design carry 
over to the case of affiliated values with both private and common components. 
Section 6 concludes and the Appendix contains proofs omitted in the text. 
Related Literature 
As mentioned above, Hansen (1985) and Riley (1988) first demonstrated the potential 
advantages of equity versus cash auctions.  In a more recent paper, Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2000) focus on first-price auctions in a setting that is similar to the model 
we study in the first part of the paper, and show that securities yield higher revenues than 
a cash-based auction. However, none of these papers provides a general means of 
comparing sets of non-linear securities, as we do here.  Nor do they compare auction 
formats or consider informal auctions.  Finally, the results in Riley (1988) and Rhodes-
Kropf and Viswanathan (2000) are conditional upon the existence of a separating 
equilibrium in which a higher type bids a higher security. For example in Rhodes-Kropf 
and Viswanathan (2000), there always exists a pooling equilibrium and in some cases it is 
the unique outcome. This is because they assume that the project does not require any 
costly inputs – thus the lowest type can offer 100% of the proceeds to the seller and 
breakeven. Thus, a low type is always willing to imitate the bid of a high type. We use a 
framework that is closer to Hansen (1985), in which the project requires costly inputs. In 
this case, we show that under certain conditions the first-price auction has a unique 
equilibrium, and it is separating. 
One reason security-bid auctions may not have received greater attention in the literature 
is perhaps due to Cremer (1987), who argues that the seller can extract the entire surplus 
if he can “buy” the winning bidder.  Specifically, the seller can offer cash to the bidder to 
cover the costs of any required investment, and ask all bidders to reveal their type.  The 
seller then offers the project to highest type in exchange for its full value.  Since bidders 
earn zero profits regardless, truthful reporting is incentive compatible. 
In the first part of the paper, we rule out such reimbursement by assuming the seller is 
cash constrained.  Moreover, we show in Section 5 that even if the seller is not cash 
constrained, reimbursing the winning bidder is extremely fragile to the introduction of 
moral hazard.  If the bidder’s investment is not verifiable and reimbursement were 
offered, then all bidders would claim the highest type, collect the reimbursement, and 
then fail to invest in the project.  Thus, to insure that bidders invest, the seller will only 
offer compensation that is contingent on the outcome of the project.  Thus Cremer’s 
approach is infeasible and the issue of security and auction design remains relevant.
2 
Board (2002), Che and Gale (2000), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2002), and Zheng 
(2001) consider auctions with financially constrained bidders who use debt, or external 
financing, in their bids.  Hence, while bids maybe expressed in terms of cash, they are in 
fact contingent claims and are thus examples of the security-bids that we examine here. 
Garmaise (2001) studies a security-bid auction in the context of a financing problem for 
an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur commits to rank securities according to some 
                                                           
2 Samuelson (1987) points to some additional problems in the implementation of the Cremer mechanism as 
it may yield an inefficient choice of a winning bidder.   5
announced beliefs regarding the distribution of the cash flows.  He examines a common 
value environment and obtains a partial characterization of the equilibrium in a binary 
model (two bidders, two types, two values). 
Other related literature includes McAfee and McMillan (1987), who solve for the optimal 
mechanism in a model with a moral hazard problem. The optimal mechanism is a 
combination of debt and equity, with the mixture depending on the distribution of types. 
Laffont and Tirole (1987) examine a similar model. Board (2004) analyzes selling real 
options to competing buyers. The seller offers a mechanism in which payments have two 
components: unconditional and conditional on exercising the option. After the auction the 
winner learns more about the profitability of the option and decides whether to exercise 
it. For a given contract, higher types have a higher probability of exercising and hence 
higher expected total payments. That linkage increases seller’s share of the expected 
surplus. Unlike our paper, contingent payments also create an inefficiency as the winner 
is not a full residual claimant and hence will not always exercise efficiently.  
Some of our results are also related to the security design literature. DeMarzo and Duffie 
(1999) consider the ex-ante security design problem faced by an issuer who will face a 
future liquidity need. They show that debt securities are optimal because they have the 
greatest liquidity. DeMarzo (2002) extends this result to the case in which the issuer 
learns his private information prior to the design of the security, as is the case here. The 
security design results of this paper are also related to the results of Nachman and Noe 
(1994). They consider a situation in which the seller is obligated to raise a fixed amount 
of capital, which leads to a pooling equilibrium using debt securities. None of these 
models consider security design in a competitive setting like the auction environment 
considered here. 
2. The  Model 
Signals and Values 
There are n risk neutral bidders who compete for the rights to a project. The project 
requires a non-contractible investment by the winner of X > 0. For tractability, we assume 
that this cost is non-random and equal across bidders.   Conditional on being undertaken 
by bidder i, the project yields a stochastic future payoff Zi. Bidders have private signals 
regarding Zi, which we denote by Vi. The seller is also risk neutral, and cannot undertake 
the project independently. The interest rate is normalized to zero. 
We make the following standard economic assumptions on the signals and payoffs: 
ASSUMPTION A.  The private signals V = (V1, …, Vn) and payoffs Z = (Z1, …, Zn) 
satisfy the following properties: 
1.  The private signals Vi are i.i.d. with density f(v) with support [vL, vH]. 
2.  Conditional on V = v, the payoff Zi has density h(z|vi) with full support [0, ∞).   6
3.  (Zi, Vi) satisfy the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (SMLRP); that 
is, the likelihood ratio h(z|v)/h(z|v′) is increasing
3 in z if v > v′.
4 
The important economic assumptions contained above are, first, that the private signals of 
other bidders are not informative regarding the signal or payoff of bidder i.  This 
assumption does not imply a pure private value setting – there may be an additional 
common value component that is common knowledge across all bidders.  Second, 
because Zi is not bounded away from zero, the project payoff cannot be used to provide a 
completely riskless payment to the seller. Finally, the private signal Vi is “good news” 
about the project payoff Zi using the standard strict version of the affiliation assumption 
(see Milgrom and Weber (1982)). 
Given the above assumptions, we normalize (without loss of generality) the private 
signals so that  
E[ Zi | Vi ] − X = Vi .   
Thus, we can interpret the signal as the NPV of the project, which we assume to be non-
negative. 
To simplify our analysis, we make several additional technical assumptions regarding 
differentiability and integrability: 
ASSUMPTION B.  The conditional density function h(z|v) is twice differentiable in 
z and v.   In addition, the functions z  h(z|v),  | z  hv(z|v) | and | z  hvv(z|v) | are 
integrable on z ∈ (0, ∞).   
These assumptions are weak, and allow us to take derivatives “through” expectation 
operators.  As a concrete example, we can consider the following payoff structure:  
 Z i = θ (X + Vi)     (1) 
where θ is independent of V and log-normal with a mean of 1.
5  Here we can interpret θ 
as the project risk. 
Feasible Bids 
The focus of this paper is on the case in which bids are securities. Bidders compete for 
the project by offering the seller a share of the final payoff. That is, the bids are in terms 
of derivative securities, in which the underlying asset is the future payoff of the project 
Zi. Bids can be described as function S(z), indicating the payment to the seller when the 
project has final payoff z. 
We make the following assumptions regarding the set of feasible bids:
6 
                                                           
3 We use ‘increasing’ in the strict sense and explicitly note weak rankings. Similarly when we use ‘higher’ 
or ‘lower’. 
4 This is equivalent to the log-supermodularity of h, which can be written as 
2
log ( | ) 0
zv hz v
∂
∂∂ >  assuming 
differentiability. 
5 More generally, what is required for the SMLRP is that log(θ) have a log-concave density function. 
6 These assumptions are typical of the security design literature (e.g. DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), Hart and 
Moore (1995), and Nachman and Noe (1994)), making it easier to compare our results to the prior 
literature.   7
DEFINITION.  A feasible security bid is described by a function S(z), such that S is 
weakly increasing, z − S(z) is weakly increasing, and 0 ≤ S(z) ≤ z.  
The set of feasible securities encompasses standard designs used in practice.  However, it 
is not completely general, and we discuss and motivate the restrictions below. 
First, S(z) ≤ z can be viewed as a liquidity or limited liability constraint for the bidder; 
only the underlying asset can be used to pay the seller.  We assume, for now, that bidders 
do not have access to cash (or other liquid assets) that they can pledge as payment; they 
can only transfer property rights in the project.
7  We make this assumption in order to 
focus first on pure security bids and simplify the exposition; we will generalize the 
setting to allow for cash payments in Section 5. 
Similarly, S(z) ≥ 0 corresponds to a liquidity or limited liability constraint for the seller; 
the seller cannot commit to pay the bidder except through a share of the project payoff.  
For example, the seller may not have the financial resources to do so, which may in fact 
be the motivation for selling off the project.  Because the seller cannot reimburse the 
bidder for the upfront investment, this assumption rules out a solution a-la Cremer 
(1987).  We take this constraint as given for now, but we show in Section 5 that this 
constraint can follow from an assumption that the bidder’s investment X is not verifiable. 
Finally, we require both the seller’s and the bidder’s payment to be weakly increasing in 
the payoff of the project.  Monotonicity is a standard feature of almost all securities used 
in practice, and so is a natural constraint to consider.
8  Most importantly, without 
monotonicity for the bidders, equilibria would not be efficient, and without monotonicity 
for the seller, the seller would have incentives to choose other than the highest bid.   
Together, these requirements are equivalent to S(0) = 0, S is continuous, and S′(z) ∈ [0, 1] 
almost everywhere.  Thus, we admit standard sets of securities, including   
1.  Equity:  The seller receives some fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the payoff: S(z) = α z.  
2.  Debt: The seller is promised a face value d ≥ 0, secured by the project: S(z) = 
min(z, d). 
3.  Convertible Debt:  The seller is promised a face value d ≥ 0, secured by the 
project, or a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the payoff: S(z) = max (α z, min(z, d)).  (This 
is equivalent to a debt plus royalty rate contract.)  
4.  Levered Equity:  The seller receives a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the payoff, after 
debt with face value d ≥ 0 is paid:  S(z) = α max(z − d, 0).  (This is equivalent 
to a royalty agreement in which the bidder recoups some costs upfront.) 
                                                           
7 We assume the bidders can invest X in the project, but X might correspond to an illiquid asset, such as 
human capital. 
8 A standard motivation for this constraint in the security design literature is that, if it did not hold, parties 
would have an incentive to “sabotage” the project and destroy output.  (Alternatively, if one party could 
both sabotage the project and artificially inflate the cash flows, a similar constraint would apply.  For 
example, if S(z0) > S(z1) for z0 < z1, the bidder may attempt to inflate the cash flows from z0 to z1 via a short-
term loan to get payoff z0 − S(z1).)  Whether it is reasonable that revenues could be distorted in this way 
depends on the context.  We do not try to defend this assumption here; but point out that it is a standard 
one, includes typical securities used in practice and guarantees a well-behaved equilibrium.   8
5.  Call Option:  The seller receives a call option on the firm with strike price k:  
S(z) = max(z − k, 0).  Higher bids correspond to lower strike prices. (This 
equivalent to the bidder retaining a debt claim.) 
Given any security S, we define  
ES(v) ≡ E[S(Zi) | Vi = v]  
to denote the excepted payoff of security S conditional on the bidder having value Vi = v. 
Thus, the expected payoff to seller if the bid S is accepted from bidder i is ES(Vi). On the 
other hand, the bidder’s expected payoff is given by Vi − ES(Vi). Thus, we can interpret Vi 
as the independent, private value for bidder i, and ES(Vi) as the payment offered.  The 
key difference from a standard auction, of course, is that the seller does not know the 
value of the bids, but only the security bid, S. The seller must infer the value of this 
security.  Since the security S is monotone, the value of the security is increasing with the 
signal Vi of the bidder, as we show below: 
LEMMA 1.  The value of the security ES(v) is twice differentiable.  For S ≠ 0, 
ES′(v) > 0, and for S ≠ Z, ES′(v) < 1. 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
Thus far we have interpreted the setting as one in which bidders compete for the right to 
undertake a project. We remark, however, that the model can also be applied to mergers 
and acquisitions.  In this case, the bidders are rival firms, each competing to take over the 
target company (the seller). We interpret X as the stand-alone value of the acquiring firm 
plus any acquisition related costs, and Vi as the bidder’s estimate of the synergy value of 
the acquisition (i.e. the value of the target once acquired). The bids in this case represent 
the securities offered to the target shareholders. 
3.  Formal Auctions with Ordered Securities 
In many auctions, bidders compete by offering “more” of a certain security. For example, 
they compete by offering more debt or more equity. We begin our analysis by examining 
formal auctions in which the seller restricts the bids to elements of a well-ordered set of 
securities. Bidders compete by offering a higher security. 
There are two main reasons why sellers restrict the set of securities that are admissible as 
bids in the auction. First, it allows them to use standard auction formats – such as first or 
second-price – to allocate the object and to determine the payments. Without an imposed 
structure, ranking different securities is very difficult and depends on the beliefs of the 
seller. There is no objective notion of the “highest” bid. 
The second reason a seller may want to restrict the set of securities is that it can enhance 
revenues. We will demonstrate this result by first (in this section) studying the revenues 
from auctions with ordered sets of securities and then (in Section 4) comparing this to the 
revenues from auctions in which the seller cannot commit to a restricted set and bidders 
can bid using any feasible security. 
Before presenting the technical details of the analysis, we consider an example that 
illustrates our main results.   9
Example: Comparison of Revenues Across Securities and Auction Formats 
Two bidders compete for a project that requires an upfront investment of X = 100. The 
NPV of the project if run by bidder i is Vi, where Vi is uniform on the interval [20, 110].  
The project is risky, however, with final value Zi which is lognormal with mean X + Vi 
and volatility of 50%. 
Total surplus is maximized by allocating the project to the highest type, in this case 
leading to an expected value of E[max(V1, V2)] = 80.  This is the maximum expected 
revenue achievable by any auction.  On the other hand, using a cash auction, the expected 
revenue is given by E[min(V1, V2)] = 50 (which is the same for first and second-price 
auctions by revenue equivalence).  Next, we calculate the revenues for different security 
designs and auction formats numerically.  See Figure 1. 
 
 Expected  Seller  Revenues 
Security Type First-price  Auction Second-price  Auction 
Cash 50.00  50.00 
Debt 50.05  50.14 
Equity 58.65  58.65 
Call Option  74.53  74.49 
Figure 1:  Expected Revenues for Different Security Designs and Auction Formats 
Several observations can be made, which coincide with our main results of this section: 
1.  Fixing the auction format (first or second-price), revenues increase moving from 
debt to equity to call options. In section 3.2 we will define a notion of “steepness” 
for securities and show that steeper securities lead to higher revenues, and that all 
security designs yield higher revenues than cash auctions. 
2.  The auction format is irrelevant for a cash auction and for an equity auction. 
While the format does make a difference for debt and call options, the rankings 
are reversed. In section 3.3 we will generalize these observations and show 
precisely when revenue equivalence will hold or fail.  Overall, though, the impact 
of the auction format on revenues is minor compared to the security design. 
3.  Among the mechanisms examined the first-price auction with debt yields the 
lowest expected revenues while the first-price auction with call options yields the 
highest expected revenues. In section 3.4 we shall see that these are the worst and 
best possible mechanisms in a broad class of security-bid auctions, and that all 
security-bid auctions dominate cash auctions. 
3.1.  Securities, Auctions and Mechanisms 
The first step in our analysis is to formalize the notion of an ordered set of securities.  An 
ordered collection of securities can be defined by a function S(s,z), where s ∈ [s0, s1] is 
the “index” of the security, and S(s,⋅) is a feasible security. That is, S(s,z) is the payment 
of security s when the output of the project has value z.  As before we define ES(s,v) ≡ 
E[S(s,Zi) | Vi = v]. 
For the collection of securities to be ordered, we require that its value, for any type, is 
increasing in s.  Then, a bid of s dominates a bid of s′ if s > s′.  We would also like to   10
allow for a sufficient range of bids so that for the lowest bid, every bidder earns a non-
negative profit, while for the highest bid, no bidder earns a positive profit.  This leads to 
the following formal requirements for an ordered set of securities: 
DEFINITION.  The function S(s,z) for s  ∈  [s0,s1] defines an ordered set of 
securities if: 
1.  S(s,⋅) is a feasible security. 
2.  For all v, ES1(s, v) > 0. 
3.  ES(s0,vL) ≤ vL and ES(s1,vH) ≥ vH. 
Examples of ordered sets include the sets of (levered) equity and (convertible) debt, 
indexed by the equity share or debt amount, and call options, indexed by the strike price. 
Given an ordered set of securities, it is straightforward to generalize the standard 
definitions of a first and second-price auction to our setting: 
FIRST-PRICE AUCTION:  Each agent submits a security. The bidder who submitted 
the highest security (highest s) wins and pays according to his security. 
SECOND-PRICE AUCTION:  Each agent submits a security. The bidder who 
submitted the highest security (highest s) wins and pays according to the second-
highest security (second-highest s). 
9 
Next, we characterize the equilibria for both types of auction formats. We are interested 
in the case for which these equilibria are efficient; that is, the case for which the highest 
value bidder wins the auction. For second-price auctions this is straightforward; the 
standard characterization of the second-price auction with private values generalizes to: 
LEMMA  2.  The unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies in the 
second-price auction is for a bidder i who has value Vi = v to submit security s(v) 
such that ES(s(v),v) = v. The equilibrium strategy s(v) is increasing.  
The above lemma implies that similar to a standard second-price auction, each bidder 
submits bids according to his true value. We now turn our attention to the first-price 
auction.  Incentive compatibility in the first-price auction implies that no bidder gains by 
mimicking another type, so that s(v) satisfies 
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where U(v) is the expected payoff of type v.  The first-order condition of (2) then leads to 
a differential equation for s.  However, an additional assumption is required to guarantee 
the second-order conditions hold: 
ASSUMPTION C.  For all (s, v) such that the bidder earns a positive expected 
profit, i.e. v − ES(s,v) > 0, the profit function is log-supermodular:  
  [ ]
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9 Note that with private values, the second-price auction is equivalent to an English auction.   11
With this assumption we have the following generalization of the standard 
characterization of the first-price auction to our setting: 
LEMMA  3.  There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium for the first-price 
auction. It is increasing, differentiable, and it is the unique solution to the 
following differential equation:  
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together with the boundary condition ES(s(vL), vL) = vL. 
Thus, given Assumption C, Lemma 3 characterizes the first-price auction and shows that 
it is efficient.  Of course, the question remains regarding how restrictive is Assumption 
C.
10  It is a joint restriction on the set of securities and the conditional distribution of Z.  It 
can be shown to hold generally in the lognormal setting (1) in the case of debt, equity, 
and levered equity securities with d ≤ X.  It can be established numerically for other types 
of securities, such as call options, under suitable parameter restrictions – for example, it 
holds in the numerical example computed earlier.  Throughout our analysis, we assume 
that it holds for all sets of securities under consideration. 
The first and second-price auctions are two standard auction mechanisms.  They share the 
features that the highest bid wins, and only the winner pays.  The first property is 
necessary for efficiency, and the second is natural in our setting, since only the winner 
can use the assets of the project to collateralize the payment.  One can construct many 
other auction mechanisms, however, that share these properties.  For example, one can 
consider third-price auctions, or auctions where the winner pays an average of the bids, 
etc.  Below we define a broad class of mechanisms that will encompass these examples: 
DEFINITION.  A General Symmetric Mechanism (GSM) is a symmetric incentive 
compatible mechanism in which the highest type wins, and pays a security chosen 
at random from a given set S.  The randomization can depend on the realization of 
types, but not on the identity of the bidders (so as to be symmetric). 
The first-price auction fits this description, with no randomization (the security is a 
function of your type).  In the second-price auction, the security you pay depends upon 
the realization of the second-highest type.  GSMs also allow for more complicated 
payment schemes that depend on all of the bids. 
I t  w i l l  b e  u s e f u l  i n  w h a t  f o l l o w s  t o  d e r i ve a basic characterization of the incentive 
compatibility condition for a GSM.  We show that any GSM can be converted into an 
equivalent mechanism in which the winner pays a security that depends only on his 
reported type without further randomization.   
                                                           
10 Assumption C is the same condition imposed on utility functions in the auction literature; e.g., Maskin 
and Riley (1984) use it to show existence and uniqueness of equilibria with risk averse bidders.  The fact 
that symmetry and Assumption C are needed underscores the fact that the efficiency of allocations is more 
fragile in first-price auctions than in second-price auctions.   12
LEMMA 4.  Incentive compatibility in a GSM implies the existence of securities 
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Thus, it is equivalent to a GSM in which the winner pays the non-random security 
ˆ
v S . 
This observation will allow us to compare revenues across mechanisms by studying the 
relationship between the set of securities S and its convex hull. 
3.2.  Ranking Security Designs 
Recall from Figure 1 that the seller’s revenues varied greatly with the security design.  As 
we will show, the revenues of different designs depend upon the “steepness” of the 
securities.  To do so, we need to formalize the notion of steepness of a set of securities.  
A simple comparison of the slopes of the securities is inadequate:  comparing debt and 
equity, debt has higher slope for low cash flows and lower slope for high cash flows.  
Rather, our notion of steepness is defined by how securities cross each other.  Intuitively, 
one security is steeper than another if it crosses that security from below.  Thus, we 
introduce the following definition: 
DEFINITION.  Security S1  strictly crosses security S2  from  below if ES1(v




12 () () ES v ES v ′′ > .  An ordered set of securities S1 is steeper than 
an ordered set S2 if for all S1 ∈ S1 and S2 ∈ S2,  S1 strictly crosses S2 from below.   
The following useful lemma shows that steepness is naturally related to the shape of the 
underlying securities – if the payoffs of the securities cross from below, then their 
expected payoffs strictly cross: 
LEMMA 5.  (Single Crossing)  A sufficient condition for S1 to strictly cross S2 
from below is that S1 ≠ S2, and there exists z
∗ such that S1(z) ≤ S2(z) for z < z
∗ and 
S1(z) ≥ S2(z) for z > z
∗. 
Comparing standard securities, note that a call option is steeper than equity, which in turn 
is steeper than debt.  See Figure 2. 
                                                           
11 A security S is in the convex hull of S if there exists πk ≥ 0 and Sk ∈ S such that ∑k πk = 1 and for all z, 
S(z) = ∑k πk Sk(z).   13
Figure 2:  Payoff Diagrams for Call Options, Equity and Debt 
Why is steepness related to auction revenues?  Consider a second-price auction, where 
the winning bidder with type V
1 pays the security bid by the second highest type V
2.  That 
is, the winner pays ES(s(V
2), V
1).  Since bidders bid their reservation value in a second-
price auction, ES(s(V
2),  V
2)  =  V
2. Hence, the security design impacts revenues only 






which is just the sensitivity of the security to the true type. By definition steeper 
securities are more sensitive, and so lead to higher revenues. 
More generally, steepness enhances competition between bidders since even with the 
same bid, a higher type will pay more.  This is the essence of the “Linkage Principle,” 
first used by Milgrom and Weber (1982) to rank auction formats for cash auctions when 
types are affiliated.
12  Applying the envelope theorem to the incentive condition (2) for a 
first-price auction, we get 
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Therefore, bidders’ payoffs are lower the higher is  2(() ,) ES s v v ; i.e., the steeper the 
security.  This leads to the following main result: 
                                                           
12 See also Krishna (2002) for a nice summary and discussion.  Typically, the linkage principle is used to 
compare formats when bidders’ signals are affiliated.  Interestingly, the same argument can be applied to 
rank security auctions when types are independent.  In security-bid auctions, unlike cash auctions, even 
with independent types the expected payment of the winner depends on his true type, as pointed out by 













PROPOSITION I.  Suppose the ordered set of securities S1 is steeper than S2.  Then 
for either a first or second-price auction, for any realization of types, the seller’s 
revenues are higher using S1 than using S2. 
As a result, flat securities, like debt, lead to low expected revenues, and steep securities, 
like call options, lead to high expected revenues.  In fact, since debt and call options are 
the flattest
13 and steepest possible securities, they represent the worst and best designs for 
the seller.  We can also extend the logic of Proposition I to cash auctions, as a cash bid is 
flatter than any security.  Thus, we have the following: 
COROLLARY.  For a first or second-price auction, standard debt yields the lowest 
possible revenues, and call options yield the highest possible revenues, of any 
security bid auction.  All security-bid auctions yield higher revenues than a cash 
auction. 
Note that in all cases, these rankings are for any realization of types, and hence are 
stronger than the usual comparison based on an expectation over types.   
3.3.  Ranking Auction Formats 
In our setting of symmetric independent private values and risk neutrality, a well-known 
and important result for cash auctions is the Revenue Equivalence Principle. It implies 
that the choice of the auction format is irrelevant when the ultimate allocation is 
efficient.
14 We now turn to examining the revenue consequences of the choice of auction 
format in a security-bid auction.  As we have seen from the numerical example of Figure 
1, revenue equivalence seems to hold for some security designs but not for others.  To 
develop some further intuition, we begin with two simple examples. 
Example: Equity Auctions and Revenue Equivalence 
There are two bidders with independent types Vi distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Upfront 
investment is X = 1. The distribution of Zi has full support with mean X + Vi.  









, which is increasing in v. In a first-price auction it is an 








=− , which is also increasing.
15 
Now observe that both auctions yield equal payoffs to the auctioneer, as in both auction 
formats the highest type wins and the average losing bid in a second-price auction equals 
the highest bid in the first-price auction: 
                                                           
13 By flattest, we mean that all other sets of securities are steeper. 
14 Vickery (1961), Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981). 
15 To verify that this is indeed an equilibrium consider the payoff of a type v who pretends to be v’: 
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From this example one may be tempted to conclude that revenue equivalence across 
auction formats holds for all security-bid auctions. Interestingly, as the next example 
shows this is not the case for all securities.
16 
Example:  Second-Price Auctions Yield Higher Revenues for Debt 
Consider a debt auction.  There are two bidders, types Vi are independent and uniform on 
on [0, 1], X = 0, and the distribution of Zi given Vi is uniform on [0, 2Vi].
17  If a bidder 
wins and pays according to a debt bid with face value b the payoff to the seller is min(b,z) 
which for a type v yields on average: 
 
2 2 1( 2 )






EZ b Z V v z b d z
vv
−
−= = − = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∫  . (4) 
In a second-price auction it is an equilibrium strategy for agents to bid their reservation 
values:  () 2
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18 
Suppose, without loss of generality, that bidder 1 wins the auction.  In a first-price 
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We conclude that bidders’ welfare is higher in the first-price auction and, since in both 
auction formats the highest type wins, revenues are higher in the second-price auction.  
Thus, revenue equivalence fails.  
To gain some insight into why revenue equivalence fails, note that in the second-price 
auction, the winner pays a random security (determined by the second highest bid).  This 
is equivalent to paying a convex combination of securities.  Now, a convex combination 
                                                           
16 We thank a referee for this example. 
17 While this example violates some of our technical assumptions (X > 0 and Z has full support), it provides 
a simple closed form solution (and also suggests that our results are somewhat more general).  
18 To verify that this is an equilibrium note from (4) that the payoff of a type v who pretends to be v′ is 
 








which is maximized for v′ = v.   16
of debt securities is not a debt security.
19  Specifically, in the second-price debt auction, 
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in a first price auction.
20  This security is not a debt security, and therefore is steeper than 
debt.  As a result of this steepness, the seller’s revenues are enhanced.  On the other hand, 
in the case of equity, a convex combination of securities is also an equity security.  Thus 
there is no change in steepness, and so no change in revenues. 
Sub and Super-Convex Sets of Securities 
The previous examples suggest that the revenue differences across auction formats will 
stem from the differences in steepness between the set of securities and its convex hull.  
This motivates the following formal classification:   
DEFINITION.  An ordered set of securities S = {S(s,⋅) : s ∈ [s0, s1]} is super-
convex if it is steeper than any non-trivial convex combination of the securities in 
S.  It is sub-convex if any non-trivial convex combination of the securities in S is 
steeper than S.
21    
Not every set falls into one of the above categories. Still, there are some important 
examples of sub- and super-convex sets: 
LEMMA  6.  The set of standard debt contracts is sub-convex.  The set of 
convertible debt contracts indexed by the equity share α, the set of levered equity 
contracts indexed by leverage, and call options are super-convex sets. 
Based on the above characterization, we can again use the Linkage Principle to rank the 
expected revenues of first and second-price auctions.  Here the proof relies on Lemma 4, 
which allows us to interpret the second-price format as a first-price mechanism in the 
convex hull of the set of securities: 
PROPOSITION II.  If the ordered set of securities is sub-convex, then the first-price 
auction yields lower expected revenues than the second-price auction.  If the 
ordered set of securities is super-convex, the first-price auction yields higher 
expected revenues than the second-price auction.  This revenue comparison also 
holds conditional on the winner’s type, for all but the lowest type. 
One subtlety in the proof of Proposition II is that the security paid by the lowest type is 
the same for both auction formats (and is defined by the zero profit condition).  Thus 
neither format employs a “steeper” security for that type.  We get around this problem by 
slightly perturbing the support of the types for one of the auction formats, comparing 
revenues, and taking the limit. 
                                                           
19 For example, consider a 50-50 mix of debt with face value 50 and debt with face value 100.  For z ∈ 
(50,100), this security has slope ½ and so is not a debt security. 
20 In this example the support of Z1 is bounded by 2v1, so the security is monotone.  Note that the bidder’s 
expected payoff with this security is 
1
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21 A non-trivial convex combination puts positive weight on more than one security.   17
Proposition II reveals that the auction format can impact revenues.  However, as we have 
seen, this revenue impact stems from the difference in steepness between the set of 
securities and their convex hull.  This difference is always less extreme than the 
difference in steepness that can be obtained by changing the security design directly.  In 
that sense, the design of the securities is much more important than the design of the 
auction format in determining revenues. 
Revenue Equivalence for Convex Sets of Securities 
While revenue equivalence does not hold for general security auctions, it does hold for 
cash, and holds for equity in our examples.  Here we ask whether it can be recovered for 
some classes of securities – that is, what is special about cash? 
From Proposition II, revenue equivalence fails in one direction for a super-convex set, 
and in the opposite direction for a sub-convex set.  Hence, a natural candidate is a set in 
the middle; i.e., a convex set: 
DEFINITION.  An ordered set of securities S is convex if it is equal to its convex 
hull. 
In fact, convex sets of securities have a simple characterization – each security is a 
convex combination of the lowest security s0 and the highest security s1.
22  Thus, each 
security can be thought of as s0 plus some “equity shares” of the security (s1 − s0), and so 
it can be thought of as a generalization of a standard equity auction.  Our main result in 
this section is that under convexity, the Revenue Equivalence continues to hold.   
PROPOSITION III (REVENUE EQUIVALENCE).  Every efficient equilibrium of a 
general symmetric mechanism (GSM) with securities from an ordered convex set 
yields the same expected revenues.  This equivalence also holds conditional on 
the winner’s type. 
Note that this is a stronger statement than equivalence between a first and second-price 
auction, as it holds for any symmetric mechanism.  Also note that the standard envelope 
argument behind Revenue Equivalence does not extend directly to security auctions.  For 
cash, there is no linkage between the true type and the bidder’s expected payment when 
types are independent, so revenues only depend upon the allocation.
23  That is not the 
case with security-bids, as we have seen.  However, when the security set is convex, 
because paying a random security is equivalent to paying the expected security drawn 
from the same set, the expected linkage across all mechanisms is identical. 
Thus, we have shown that the important property needed for the revenue equivalence 
principle is that the securities be ordered and convex.  This is true for cash, but also true 
more generally for equity-type auctions.  Also, because we can construct a first-price 
equilibrium by computing the expected security in a second-price equilibrium, we can 
                                                           
22 To see why, note that since the set is convex, for each λ there exists a mapping s:[0, 1] → [s0, s1] such 
that S(s(λ), z) = (1−λ) S(s0, z) + λ S(s1, z).  Then s(0) = s0, s(1) = s1 and since the set is ordered and s0 ≠ s1, 
s(λ) is increasing.  Thus, the result follows if s(λ) is continuous.  But since ES(s(λ),v) = (1−λ) ES(s0, v) + λ 
ES(s1, v) is continuous, so is s(λ) since ES(s,v) is increasing in s.   
23 That is, in the case of cash auctions, (3) reduces to U′(v) = F
n−1(v).   18
weaken our condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in the first-price 
auction: 
COROLLARY.  Even absent Assumption C, given a convex ordered set of 
securities, there exists an efficient symmetric equilibrium in a first-price auction 
with the same expected revenues as in a second-price auction.   
3.4.  Best and Worst Mechanisms 
We can combine the results of the previous two sections to determine the best and worst 
security design and format combinations.  Note that, since debt is a sub-convex set, from 
Proposition II the first-price auction is inferior to the second-price auction, and 
conversely for call options, which are super-convex. The following proposition 
establishes that a first-price auction with debt and with call options bound the range of 
outcomes for the seller for a broad class of mechanisms. 
PROPOSITION  IV.  A first-price auction with call options yields the highest 
expected revenues amongst all general symmetric mechanisms.  A first-price 
auction with standard debt yields the lowest expected revenues amongst all 
general symmetric mechanisms.   
PROOF: The proof follows that of Proposition II, except that instead of the second-price 
auction we consider a general symmetric mechanism over some subset of the feasible 
securities.  The result follows as a call option contract is steeper and a standard debt 
contract is flatter than any convex combination of feasible securities (where we use the 
same trick as in the proof of the Corollary to Proposition I if the sets of securities 
intersect).  
Proposition IV establishes that the design of the security is more important than the 
specific auction format:  the revenue consequences of shifting from debt to call options in 
a first-price auction exceeds the consequences of any change in the auction mechanism. 
We remark that Proposition IV is stated with respect to the particular set of feasible 
securities we have allowed thus far.  It can be extended in the obvious way:  for any 
feasible set, if there is a steepest set of securities which is (super-)convex, then a (first-
price) auction using this set yields the highest possible revenues.  Similarly, if there is a 
flattest set which is (sub-)convex, then a (first-price) auction using this set yields the 
lowest possible revenues. 
For example, if bidders can pay cash, a cash auction is the worst possible auction for the 
seller.  This is because cash, which is insensitive to type, is even flatter than standard debt 
securities (see Section 5.1 for a further discussion of this case). 
Alternatively, the seller may be able to increase revenues by using securities that are even 
more leveraged than call options.  For example, the seller might pay the bidder cash for 
additional equity.  This strategy is related to the result of Cremer (1987).  We have 
assumed so far that the seller does not have the resources to make such a payment.  We 
also show in Section 5 that even if the seller does have the resources, due to moral hazard 
he will not make such payments if the bidder’s investment X is non-verifiable.  (Indeed, 
even call options may be too levered in some settings of moral hazard, as we discuss in 
our concluding remarks).   19
4.  Informal Auctions: The Signaling Game 
In the previous section we considered formal auctions in which bidders are restricted to 
choose securities from a specific well-ordered set. In reality, there is often no such 
restriction.  That is, the seller is unable to commit to ignore offers that are outside the set.  
As a result, the seller will consider all bids, choosing the most attractive bid ex-post.  In 
this case, the “security design” is in the hands of the bidders, who can choose to bid using 
any feasible security.  
Without the structure of a well-ordered set, once the bids are submitted there is no 
obvious notion of a “highest” bid.  In this case, the seller faces the task of choosing one 
of the submitted bids.  Since there is no ex-ante commitment by the seller to a decision 
rule, the seller will choose the winning bid that offers the highest expected payoff.  Since 
the payoff of the security depends on the bidder’s type, the seller’s choice may depend 
upon his beliefs regarding the bid each type submits in equilibrium.  Thus, this setting has 
the features of a signaling game that takes the form: 
1.  Bidders submit simultaneous bids that are feasible securities. 
2.  The seller chooses the winning bid. 
3.  The winner pays his bid and runs the project. 
We consider a sequential equilibrium of this game.  We argue that in the informal 
auctions bidders will choose the flattest securities possible. That is, they will bid with 
cash, if it is feasible; otherwise, they will bid with debt.  Thus, Proposition IV implies 
that the seller’s expected revenues are the lowest possible from any general auction 
mechanism. 
To gain some insight, consider first a case in which bidders can use cash. We argue that 
in equilibrium bidders use only cash.  The intuition for this result is as follows.  Let Sv be 
the security bid by type v.  When a bidder of type v decides on his bid, he has the option 
to mimic other types.  In particular, he can mimic a type v′ = v − dv just below him.  Such 
a deviation has two effects.  First, it will reduce his probability of winning to that of type 
v′.  Second, it will lower his expected payment if he wins from  ( ) v ES v  to  '() v ES v .  On 
the margin, these two effects must balance out (otherwise there is a profitable deviation). 
But now suppose types just below v use security bids rather than cash.  Consider the 
deviation by type v to a cash bid of amount  ' (' ) (' ) v bv E S v = .  Since the seller values this 
cash bid the same as the bid  ' v S  by type v′, the marginal effect on the probability of 
winning is the same as if he deviates to  ' v S . However, because the expected value of the 
security is increasing in the true type, the expected payment is  '' (' ) (' ) () vv bv E S v E S v = < .  
Thus, if type v is indifferent to a deviation using securities, he will profit from a deviation 
using cash.  As a result, an equilibrium will only involve cash bids. 
The second step of the logic above can be applied even when cash bids are not available.  
When mimicking a lower type, it is cheaper for a higher type to use a security that is less 
sensitive to the true type – i.e., a flatter security – than that used in the proposed 
equilibrium. This reasoning suggests an equilibrium will involve the flattest securities 
available.   20
However, there is a difficulty with extending this result when cash is not available.  The 
gain from a deviation depends crucially on the seller’s evaluation of the bid.  The 
argument we gave above is simplified by the fact that the value of a cash bid is 
unambiguous; the seller does not need to rely on his beliefs. But when bidders do not use 
cash, the value of any off-equilibrium bid depends on the seller’s off-equilibrium beliefs. 
As with general signaling games, there are many equilibria of this game if we do not 
impose any restrictions on the beliefs of the seller when an “unexpected” bid is 
observed.
24  We turn to such restrictions next. 
Refining Beliefs – The D1 Criterion 
To rule out equilibria supported with arbitrary off-equilibrium beliefs, the standard 
refinement in the signaling literature is the notion of strategic stability, introduced by 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).  For our purposes, a weaker refinement, known as D1, is 
sufficient to identify a unique equilibrium.
25  The D1 refinement (see Cho and Kreps 
(1987), Cho and Sobel (1990)) is a refinement commonly used in the security design 
literature.
26  Intuitively, the D1 refinement criterion requires that if the seller observes an 
out-of-equilibrium bid, the seller should believe the bid came from the type “most eager” 
to make the deviation. 
In order to define the D1 criterion in our context, we introduce the following notation.  
First, let S
i be the random variable representing the security bid by bidder i, which will 
depend on Vi.  For any feasible security S, let R
i(S) be the scoring rule assigned by the 
seller, representing the expected revenues the seller anticipates from that security, given 
his beliefs.  Along the equilibrium path, the seller’s beliefs are correct, so that the scoring 
rule satisfies 
  () ()
ii
i R SE E S V SS ⎡⎤ == ⎣⎦ .   (5) 
Given the seller’s scoring rule, R
i, it must also be the case in equilibrium that bidders are 
bidding optimally.  That is, conditional on Vi = v, S
i solves 
 () m a x ( () ) ( () )
ii i
S Uv PRS v E S v =− ,    (6) 
where P
i(r) is the probability that r is the highest score.
27  Thus, U
i(v) is the equilibrium 
expected payoff for bidder i with type v. 
Suppose the seller observes an out-of-equilibrium bid, so that the score is not determined 
by (5).  Which types would be most likely to gain from such a bid?  For each type v, we 
can determine the minimum probability of winning, B
i(S,v), that would make bidding S 
attractive: 
                                                           
24 In our context, if the seller believes all off-equilibrium bids are made by the lowest type, this will 
minimize the gain from deviating using securities.  These beliefs seem unreasonable, however, since many 
securities would be unprofitable for the lowest type. 
25 Strictly speaking, D1 is defined for discrete type spaces.  However, it can be naturally extended to 
continuous types (see, e.g., Ramey 1996).   
26 See, e.g. Nachman and Noe (1994) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999). 
27 If there are ties, we require that P
i be consistent with some tie-breaking rule.   21
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Then the D1 criterion requires that the seller believe that a deviation to security S came 
from the types which would find S attractive for the lowest probability of winning:
28 
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Thus, a sequential equilibrium satisfying the D1 criterion for the auction game can be 
described by scoring rules R
i and bidding strategy S
i for all i satisfying (5)-(7). 
Equilibrium Characterization 
Using the D1 refinement, we can now extend the argument we made for cash deviations 
to other securities.  Suppose type v mimics type v′ = v − dv.  The cost of doing so for type 
v is  '() v ES v .  Now suppose v instead deviates to a security S that is flatter than  ' v S  and 
such that  ' (' ) (' ) v ES v ES v = .  Because the security is flatter, it has a lower cost for type v, 
' () () v ES v ES v < .  How would the seller respond to the deviation S? 
Because S is flatter than  ' v S , it is a more expensive security for types below v′, and 
cheaper for types above v′, than  ' v S .  Therefore, the types that are “most eager” to deviate 
to S must be above v′.  By D1, this implies that the seller will evaluate S as at least as 
valuable as  ' v S .  Therefore, if type v is indifferent to a deviation to  ' v S , he will profit 
from a deviation to a flatter security S.  As a result, an equilibrium will involve only the 
flattest possible securities. 
We now proceed with a formal statement of our results.  As is standard in the auction 
setting, we will focus on symmetric equilibria.
29  We continue to maintain Assumption C 
for standard debt, so that existence of an efficient equilibrium of the first-price auction is 
assured.  Then we have 
PROPOSITION V.  Given symmetric strategies, there is a unique equilibrium of the 
informal auction satisfying D1.  This equilibrium is equivalent, in both payoffs 
and strategies, to the equilibrium of a first-price auction in which players bid with 
the flattest securities feasible. In particular, if they can bid with cash, they will 
only use cash; if cash is not feasible, they will bid with standard debt contracts. 
Again, we can now combine this result with the result of the previous section to formalize 
the value of the seller’s ability to commit to a restricted set of securities. 
COROLLARY.  If the seller can commit to a formal auction with an ordered set of 
securities other than debt contracts, then expected revenues are higher than 
without such commitment.   
PROOF: Follows immediately from Proposition IV and Proposition V.     
                                                           
28 We have economized on notation here.  If the set of minimizers is not unique, the score is in the convex 
hull of ES(v) for v in the set of minimizers. 
29 That is, we restrict attention to equilibria in which the bidders use symmetric strategies and the seller 
uses the same scoring rule for all players.   22
5. Extensions 
Here we consider several extensions to the basic model.  First, we consider expanding the 
space of security bids by relaxing the liquidity constraints.  Second, we consider 
expanding the space of mechanisms by allowing the seller to set reservation bids.  Third, 
we consider changing the information structure by allowing for correlated types and 
common values. 
5.1.  Relaxing the Liquidity Constraints 
We have assumed that both the seller and the bidders are liquidity constrained. We now 
explore implications of either the seller or bidders having access to cash.   
Moral Hazard: Non-Contractible Investment  
Up to now, we have restricted bids to satisfy S(0) ≥ 0 assuming the seller is liquidity 
constrained. But if the seller has cash, securities in which the seller reimburses the winner 
for a portion of the initial investment (and thus have S(0) < 0) are feasible.  Importantly, 
these securities can be steeper than call options and so increase revenues.  For example, 
the seller could auction off the rights to a fraction ε of the cash flows, and reimburse the 
winner directly for the investment (1−ε)X.  By making ε arbitrarily small, the seller can 
extract the entire surplus.  While this theoretical mechanism was proposed by Cremer 
(1987), it is not observed in practice.  A likely reason is moral hazard:  if the winner’s 
investment is not fully contractible, and if the winner receives only a small fraction of 
future revenues, then he may under-invest.
30   
For example, suppose that after the auction the winning bidder i can choose whether to 
invest X.  If X is invested, the payoff of the project is Zi as before, and his payment to the 
seller is S(Zi).  If X is not invested, the payoff is 0, and his payment to the seller is S(0).  
If S(0) ≥ 0, the bidder’s payoff is non-positive without investment, and so the option not 
to invest is irrelevant. But suppose a bid with S(0)  < 0 is accepted with positive 
probability.  Then every bidder, including the lowest type, can earn positive profits by 
making such a bid and not investing.  Yet if bidders do not invest and S(0) < 0, the seller 
loses money.  As a result, the seller would choose not to accept such securities, as shown 
below: 
PROPOSITION VI.  Suppose that the seller is not liquidity constrained and the 
investment X is not contractible.  Then,  
1.  In a first and second-price formal auction (with an ordered set of securities): 
a.  If a security without reimbursement is allowed, then with probability 1 
the winning bid satisfies S (0)  ≥ 0. That is, competition between 
bidders rules out reimbursement. 
                                                           
30 A real example of the importance of moral hazard is provided by several oil lease auctions run by the 
U.S. Department of the Interior in which the bidders bid high royalty rates (see Binmore and Klemperer 
(2002)).  As a result, though development was economically efficient, many of the oil fields were left 
undeveloped because bidders did not capture enough of the revenues to warrant their private investment.  In 
the end, the government was left with almost no revenues.   23
b.  If all securities involve reimbursement, then all bidders bid the highest 
allowed security and do not invest, leading to negative revenues for the 
seller. 
2.  Any mechanism in which bids with S(0) < 0 win with positive probability 
cannot be efficient. 
3.  In an informal auction, securities with S(0) < 0 are used with probability 0. 
Thus, when X is not contractible, even if the seller has cash we can rule out 
reimbursement from the seller – it would either not occur in equilibrium or not be in the 
seller’s best interest.   
Partial Cash Bids 
Suppose bidders have cash equal to B, where B is known and common to all bidders.
31  
Cash relaxes the limited liability restriction for bidders so that the flattest securities are 
now debt claims on the total assets of the bidder (cash + project), defined by 
  S
D(d, z) = min(d, B + z) = min(d, B) + min((d − B)
+, z). 
As the decomposition above reveals, we can think of this security as an immediate cash 
payment (up to B), plus a standard debt claim on the project (for amounts above B).  
Because these securities become flatter as B increases, the seller’s expected revenues 
decrease with B.  A pure cash auction, yielding the lowest possible revenues, is possible 
for a second-price auction if B exceeds vH, and for a first-price auction if B exceeds the 
expected maximum type for n−1 bidders (which is less than vH).  Thus a first-price 
auction yields lower revenues for the seller as long as B < vH.  These results are consistent 
with Board (2002), who considers debt auctions and shows that they yield higher 
revenues than cash auctions, with the smallest effect for first-price auctions. 
5.2. Reservation  Prices 
In this section we discuss briefly how reservation prices can be incorporated into our 
analysis.  Commitment to a reservation price can improve the seller’s revenues, and even 
absent commitment, a reservation price may be relevant if selling the project entails an 
opportunity cost. 
In the case of formal auctions, we assumed earlier that the lowest security, s0, was such 
that all types earn non-negative profits; that is, ES(s0,vL) ≤ vL.  A reservation price is 
equivalent to assuming that s0 restricts that set of types that can profitably participate.  In 
particular, if we choose s0 so that 
  ES(s0, vr) = vr 
for some type vr ∈ [vL, vH], then vr is the reservation price
32, and types below vr will not 
be allocated the project. 
                                                           
31 Che and Gale (2000), Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2002), and Zheng (2001) consider models where 
the cash amount is heterogeneous and privately known. 
32 We refer to this as a “price” since it is the minimum amount the seller will accept in order to sell the 
object.   24
All of our results regarding formal auctions generalize to this case.  In particular, holding 
fixed the reservation price, the seller’s revenues are higher using steeper securities.  In 
addition, first-price auctions are superior for super-convex (sets of) securities, second-
price auctions are superior for sub-convex securities, and revenue equivalence holds for 
convex ordered securities.  The proof of these results follows exactly as the proofs in 
Section 3: we apply the linkage principle to compare U′(v) across settings, but now use 
the boundary condition U(vr) = 0 rather than U(vL) = 0. 
A similar generalization applies to informal auctions.  There, since there is no 
commitment, it is natural to interpret vr as the outside opportunity for the seller.  Thus, 
the seller will not sell unless he believes the best security is worth more than vr.  Consider 
the standard debt security 
d
r S  defined by  ( )
d
rr r ES v v = .  Types below vr would lose 
money submitting this security.  Thus, in a D1 equilibrium, the seller must believe the 
bidder submitting 
d
r S  is at least type vr, and this bid would be accepted.  The remainder 
of the proof can be extended to show that the unique D1 equilibrium is a first-price 
standard debt auction with reservation price vr, which has the lowest possible revenues 
for any auction mechanism with this reservation price. 
5.3.  Affiliated Private and Common Values  
Our model thus far is based on the classic independent private value framework. We 
discuss here how our results generalize when values are affiliated (see Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982) and may have common, as well as private, components.
33  Formally we 
assume that: 
ASSUMPTION D.  The private signals V = (V1, …, Vn) and payoffs Z = (Z1, …, Zn) 
satisfy the following properties: 
1.  The private signals Vi are affiliated and distributed symmetrically with full 
support [vL, vH]. 
2.  Conditional on V = v, the payoff Zi has density h(z|vi,v−i) with full support [0, 
∞). The distribution is symmetric in the last n-1 arguments. 
3.  (Z, V) are strictly affiliated. 
First we consider formal auctions with a fixed auction format.  Under appropriate 
conditions there exists a unique symmetric increasing equilibrium for both the first and 
the second-price auction.
34  Given an efficient equilibrium, we can generalize our result 
regarding the impact of the security design on the resulting revenues:
35  
                                                           
33 Affiliation (essentially, the log-supermodularity of the joint density function) implies that “good news” 
about one of the variables (learning it lies in a higher interval), raises the expectation of any monotone 
function of the variables.  With two random variables, it is equivalent to the MLRP. 
34 For a second-price auction we do not need extra conditions. For a first-price auction, we again need log-
supermodularity of the winner’s profit, which becomes more complicated in this case.   
35 See appendix for proofs.   25
   Given a symmetric increasing equilibrium, then fixing the mechanism (first or 
second-price), steeper sets of securities yield higher revenues for the seller.
 36 
The intuition for this result is the same as before – steeper securities increase the effective 
competition between bidders since they are more costly for higher types. 
What about the comparison of auction formats?  Here it is useful to consider first the case 
of affiliated private values (i.e., h(z|vi,v−i) does not depend on v−i).  In this setting, revenue 
equivalence fails even for cash auctions, as shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982).  In our 
setting, 
   With affiliated private values, for both convex and sub-convex sets of securities, 
second-price auctions generate higher expected revenues than first-price auctions. 
This result again follows from the linkage principle, since the second-highest bid is 
affiliated with, or “linked” to, the winner’s value.  This linkage creates an advantage for 
the second-price auction. 
On the other hand, if there is a common value component to the asset, this can have an 
opposing effect regarding the optimal auction format, and create and advantage for a 
first-price auction.  We show this below for a case of independent signals and common 
value: 
   Suppose  Vi are independent, and  ij j EZ V V = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∑ .
37  Then for an equity 
auction, the first-price auction generates higher expected revenues than a second-
price auction. 
The intuition for this result is that, since the equity-share is increasing with the bidder’s 
type, and therefore correlated with the asset’s value, to generate the same expected 
revenues the expected equity-share in the second-price auction is lower than in the first-
price auction.  But the lower average equity share reduces the linkage to the winner’s 
own type, reducing revenues in the second-price auction. 
Finally, consider the setting of an informal auction.  With affiliated private values, our 
conclusions regarding the informal auction hold – high types prefer to use flat securities 
to separate from lower types: 
   In the unique D1 equilibrium, bidders use the flattest possible securities leading to 
the lowest revenues for the seller.
38  
With common values the signaling game becomes much more complex.  Now, after 
observing the bids, the seller is potentially more informed than the bidder.  Thus the 
bidder faces an adverse selection problem.  This adverse selection is mitigated by making 
the seller’s payoff sensitive to revenues, potentially leading bidders to bid using steeper 
securities. We leave the analysis of this case for future research. 
                                                           
36 In this case, the notion of steepness is that given in Lemma 5, which, combined with affiliation, will 
imply that securities strictly cross in terms of their expected costs. 
37 This is the so-called “Wallet Game”; see Bulow and Klemperer (2002). 
38 The proof is the same as Proposition V with a minor modification to step 3.  Intuitively, affiliation 
provides the seller with information about the bidder’s type after observing other bids, but this plays no role 
in a separating equilibrium.   26
6. Conclusion 
We have examined an aspect of bidding relatively ignored in auction theory – the fact 
that bidders’ payments often depend on the realization of future cash flows.  This embeds 
a security design problem within the auction setting. First we analyzed formal auctions in 
which the seller chooses the security design and restricts bidders to bid only using 
securities in an ordered set.  This enables a simple ranking of the securities and the use of 
standard auction formats. We showed conditions for which Revenue Equivalence holds, 
and determine the optimal and worst format and security design combinations.  In 
particular, we showed that revenues are increasing in the steepness of the securities, and 
demonstrated that the first-price debt auction yields the lowest revenues, whereas a first-
price auction with call options yields the highest revenues, across a broad class of 
possible mechanisms. 
Next we considered informal auctions in which the seller does not restrict the set of 
securities or the mechanism ex ante, but chooses the most attractive bid ex post.  In this 
case, security design is in the hands of the bidders.  We show that this yields the lowest 
possible expected revenues for the seller, and is equivalent to a first-price auction using 
the flattest feasible securities, such as debt or cash. Thus there are strong incentives for 
the seller to be actively involved in the auction design and select the securities that can be 
used. 
Finally, we generalized our results to include relaxed liquidity constraints (incorporating 
aspects of moral hazard), partial cash bids, reservation prices, and affiliated and common 
values.  All of our main insights and results are robust to these features. 
There are a number of natural extensions to our framework.  For example, the role of the 
security design often extends beyond the auction to determine the winner’s and seller’s 
incentives ex-post.  While we discuss a simple moral hazard setting in Section 5.1, more 
general settings can be considered.  Some of these can be modeled as further restrictions 
on the set of feasible securities.  For example, consider the case in which the winner has 
the opportunity to divert cash flows from the project, with each dollar diverted generating 
a private payoff of δ < 1.
39  In this case, by the usual revelation principle argument, we 
can restrict attention to securities that do not induce diversion; i.e., such that 1 − S′(z) ≥ δ.  
Because this limits the steepness of the security, it lowers the revenues the seller can 
achieve using the optimal formal auction.  On the other hand, it also rules out debt.  So if 
bidders are cash constrained, the flattest possible securities have the form S(d, z) = min(d, 
(1−δ) z).  Because these securities are not as flat as standard debt, the revenues of the 
seller are in fact enhanced by this restriction.
40   
More generally, our analysis provides clear intuition for the way in which moral hazard 
concerns will interact with competition and revenues in the auction.  For example, if the 
revenues of the project are costly to verify, we know from Townsend (1979) that it is 
optimal for the party who observes the cash flows to be the residual claimant.  Thus, if 
                                                           
39 This is a special case of Lacker and Weinberg’s (1989) model of “costly state falsification.” 
40 Similarly, if the seller can divert cash flows, the constraint becomes S′(z) ≥ δ, which rules out cash or 
debt and enhances revenues.  Other moral hazard settings can also be considered.  If the winner can add 
arbitrary risk (see, e.g., Ravid and Spiegel (1997)), then bidders are restricted to using convex securities, 
enhancing revenues.     27
the seller observes the cash flows, the optimal agency contract is a call option, which also 
maximizes the auction revenues.  If the winner observes the cash flows, there is a tradeoff 
between verification costs, which are minimized with debt securities, and auction 
revenues. 
For mergers and acquisitions, tax implications and accounting treatment are likely to be 
important.  For example, the deferral of taxes possible with an equity-based transaction 
may give rise to the use of equity bids even in an unrestricted setting.  Our results imply 
that this tax preference can also lead to enhanced revenues for the seller. 
It would be useful to allow for more complicated information structures.  For example, 
bidders may have private information not only about V but also about X, or the seller may 
have private information.  Another extension of our model that would be useful in 
applications would be to allow for asymmetries in bidders’ valuations and costs.  We 
believe that our result showing that debt is the outcome for the informal auction 
generalizes to this setting. However, for formal mechanisms, we are confronted with the 
relative lack of theoretical results in the presence of asymmetries, even in the case of cash 
auctions. 
7. Appendix 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:  Using Assumption B and the fact that S(z) is between 0 and z, 
dominated convergence implies that the derivatives exist and are equal to 
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, 
and the inequality is strict for z such that S(z) ≠ S(z
∗).  This set has positive measure since 
S ≠ 0 and Z has full support conditional on v.  Hence, ES′(v) > 0.  The proof of ES′(v) < 1 
is identical, substituting Z − S(Z) for S.    
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:  The proof that s(v), which solves ES(s,v) = v, is the unique weakly 
undominated strategy is standard. Differentiating ES(s(v),v) = v yields, 
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Thus  s increasing in v follows, since ES is increasing in s, and from Lemma 1, 
[ ] (,) v vE S s v ∂
∂ − > 0 as long as S(s,Z) ≠ Z (which is not possible in equilibrium since X > 
0).    
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:  Let P(s) be the probability of winning with a bid of s, and π(s, v) = 
log(P(s)) + log(v − ES(s, v)).  Then  
 ( ) argmax ( )( ( , )) argmax ( , ) ss sv Ps v E Ssv sv ∈− = π . 
By Assumption C the objective in the second expression is strictly supermodular, and so 
by Topkis (1978), any selection s(v) is weakly increasing in v.  If s(v) were constant on an 
interval, then the highest type in that interval can increase his bid marginally and increase 
his probability of winning, and thus his payoff, by a discrete amount.  Thus, s(v) is 
increasing.  This implies P(s(v)) = Fn(v) ≡ F(v)
n−1.   
Continuity of s follows since otherwise a type just above a discontinuity could gain by 
lowering his bid.  For differentiability, note that we can rewrite the bidder’s optimality 
condition as 
  ' argmax ( ')( ( ( '), )) vn vF v v E S s v v ∈− . 
Letting u(s, v) = v − ES(s,v), this implies that for any v′ > v, 
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 . 
Changing the roles of v and v′ yields, for some s
∗∗ between s(v) and s(v′), 
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Taking limits establishes the differential equation for s.   
For the boundary condition, note that P(s(vL)) = 0, and since all types earn non-negative 
profits ES(s(vL), vL) ≤ vL.  But if the inequality were strict, the lowest type could raise his 
bid and earn positive profits with positive probability.   
Having established uniqueness, it remains to verify existence by establishing the 
sufficiency of the bidder’s first order condition.  Consider any s′ such that s(vL) < s′ < 
s(v).  There exists vL < v′ < v such that s(v′) = s′.  Thus, by Assumption C, 
  πs(s′, v) > πs(s′, v′) = 0.  
A similar argument shows that for s(v)  <  s′  <  s(vH),  πs(s′,  v)  < 0 .   H e n c e ,  π is 
quasiconcave in s and the first order condition is sufficient.   
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:  Using the revelation principle, note that if type v reports v′ he will 
win with probability F
n−1(v′).  His expected payoff conditional on winning is equal to (v 
− T(v, v′)), where T(v, v′) is the expected payment by type v when he reports v′.  Thus,   29
type v will choose v′ to maximize  ( )
1(' ) (,' )
n Fv v T v v
− − .  Thus, we need to establish the 
correct form for T.   
Letting 
*
i V−  be the highest type excluding i, bidder i wins with report v′ if 
* ' i Vv − < .  Let 
' v S  ∈ S be the random security that he will pay if he wins.  Then define 
 
*
'' ˆ () () ' vv i Sz E SzV v − ⎡⎤ =≤ ⎣⎦
 , (8) 
a security in the convex hull of S (which does not depend on i by symmetry).  This is the 
“expected security” paid with a report of v′.    Using the fact that types are independent 
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This completes the proof.    
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:  Let G(z) = S1(z) − S2(z).  Then if EG(v
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and the inequality is strict on the set {z : S1(z) ≠ S2(z)}.  Thus, EG′(v
∗) > 0.    
PROOF OF PROPOSITION I:  Consider a second-price auction.  From Lemma 2, the winner 
is the highest type, V
1, and pays the second highest security bid by the second highest 
type, V
2.  Let S1 be the security bid by type V
2 under S1 and S2 be the security bid by type 
V
2 under S2.  Since ES(s(v), v) = v in a second-price auction, V
2 = ES1(V
2) = ES2(V
2).  But 
then, since S1 is steeper, S1 strictly crosses S2 from below and so ES1(V
1) > ES2(V
1).  
Thus, the seller’s expected revenues are higher under S1.   30
For the first-price auction, let U
j(v) be the equilibrium payoff for type v, and 
j
v S  the 
security bid, with the set Sj.  First, note that efficiency implies U
1(vL) = U
2(vL) = 0.  Since 
  
11
ˆˆ ˆ () m a x () ( () ) () ( () )
jn j n j
vv v U v Fv v E S v Fv v E S v
−− ≡− = − , 
if  U
1(v)  =  U
2(v), we have 
12 () () vv ESv E Sv = .  But if S1 is steeper than S2, 
12 () () vv ES v ES v ′′ > .  Thus, from the envelope condition, 
 
111 12 2 () () ( 1 () ) () ( 1 () ) ()
nn
vv Uv F v E Sv F v E Sv Uv
−− ′′ ′ ′ =−< −= . 
Hence, U
1(v) < U
2(v) for v > vL.  Since bidders’ payoffs are lower, the seller’s expected 
revenue is higher for each realization of the winning type under S1.       
PROOF OF COROLLARY TO PROPOSITION I: Since debt has slope 1 and then 0, it strictly 
crosses any other non-debt security from above.  Call options have slope 0 and then 1, 
and so strictly cross any other non-option security from below.  The result then follows 
directly from Proposition I. 
What about the comparison of debt securities to other sets that may include debt?  The 
proof for second-price auctions is unchanged.  But for first-price auctions, we have the 
minor difficulty that a debt security does not strictly cross another debt security.  In that 
case we modify the set of debt securities by adding ε in cash – i.e., the security payoff is 
S(z) = min(z, d) + ε.  This set strictly crosses any other set from above, and so the 
revenues can be ranked as in PROPOSITION I.  The result then follows from the continuity 
of the equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the first-price auction as we take the limit as ε 
→ 0.  We can do the same for call options by subtracting cash ε from each security.   
PROOF OF LEMMA 6:  For debt securities, consider any feasible security S2.  If S2(z) > 
min(d, z), then z > d and so S2(z′) > min(d, z′) for all z′ > z.  Hence min(d, z) crosses S2 
from above.   
For levered equity, note that a convex combination of these securities for different levels 
of leverage is a security S2(z) that is convex in z with maximum slope α.  Thus, any 
levered equity security crosses S2 from below.  A similar argument applies to call options, 
and to convertible debt when indexed by the equity share α.    
PROOF OF PROPOSITION II: Consider the direct revelation game corresponding to the 
two auctions.  Let 
1
v S  be the security bid in the first-price auction, and let 
2
v S  be the 
expected security payment in the second-price auction for a winner with type v, defined 
according to (8) in the proof of Lemma 4.  Then, if the set of securities is super-convex, 
1
v S  crosses 
2
v S  from below, and a nearly identical argument to that used in the proof of 
Proposition I for first-price auctions can be applied to prove that the seller’s expected 
revenues are higher in the first-price auction.   
The only complication is that the securities issued by the lowest types are identical in the 
first and second-price auctions, so that the securities do not strictly cross and 
12 '( ) '( ) LL Uv Uv = .  To resolve this, we can change the support in the first-price auction 
to [vL+ε, vH], with an atom at vL+ε with mass equal to that originally on the set [vL, vL+ε].    31
Now, U
1(vL+ε) = 0 < U
2(vL+ε), and by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition I, 
U
1(v) < U
2(v) for all v ≥ vL+ε.  Then by the continuity of the strategies and payoffs in the 
boundary of the support vL+ε, the first-price auction has weakly higher revenues.   
However, since the securities strictly cross for higher types, the revenues cannot be equal.   
The proof for sub-convex sets is identical, with the inequalities reversed (and taking the 
limit of the support for the second-price auction).    
PROOF OF PROPOSITION III:  In a GSM, the winner pays according to a random security.  
From Lemma 4, the expected payment by type v reporting v′ can be written as  ' ˆ () v ES v , 
where  ' ˆ
v S  is in the convex hull of the ordered set of securities S.  Since S is convex, we 
can define s
∗(v′) such that 
 
*
' ˆ (( ' ) , ) ( ) v Ss v S ⋅= ⋅. 
Because S is ordered, incentive compatibility implies s
∗(v) must be increasing; otherwise 
a bidder could raise the probability of winning without increasing the expected payment.  
Thus, s
∗(v) defines an efficient equilibrium for the first-price auction.  The result then 
follows from the uniqueness of equilibrium in the first-price auction.    
PROOF OF PROPOSITION V:  We focus on the no-cash case as the argument with cash is 
similar (and even simpler as off-equilibrium beliefs do not play any major role). In step 1 
we show existence of a debt-based equilibrium that survives the D1 refinement. In steps 2 
and 3 we show that no other equilibrium exists. In step 2 we prove that any equilibrium is 
equivalent to the equilibrium of a first-price auction in debt contracts. The logic is that, 
by D1, a deviation to a debt contract with the same cost as the original equilibrium bid 
cannot decrease the probability of winning. Therefore such a debt bid is also optimal and 
we can construct a payoff-equivalent equilibrium in which only debt is used. In step 3, 
we use the envelope condition to argue that the securities used in the original equilibrium 
must have slopes equal to debt contracts. But we know from Lemma 5 that debt is flatter 
than any non-debt security, so the original securities must have been debt as well. Finally, 
we invoke Lemma 3 that states uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium in debt contracts. 
The proof differs somewhat from the intuition in the text, which considers deviations by 
type v to mimic type v′ = v−dv. This “local deviation” is more intuitive, but is not precise 
since types are not discrete and therefore there is no nearby type v′ that type v is truly 
indifferent towards mimicking.  With continuous types, we first show that type v is 
indifferent to switching to debt (without mimicking another type) in step 2, and then 
show in step 3 that if the original equilibrium were not debt, because debt is flatter there 
must be a profitable deviation. 
STEP  1:  The equilibrium from a first-price debt auction is a D1 equilibrium in the 
unrestricted auction (with appropriate off-equilibrium beliefs). 
We need to demonstrate that given the strategies from the debt auction, there is a set of 
beliefs satisfying D1 that support this equilibrium in the unrestricted auction.  We 
construct the beliefs R using (5) and (7).  If (7) does not produce a unique score, we can 
choose the lowest one.  We now show that this supports the equilibrium.   32
STEP 1A:  For debt contracts, the score is increasing in the face value of the debt.  That is, 
R(S
d) is increasing in d, where S
d(z) = min(d,z). 
Note that  
 
()










Because the objective function is strictly log-supermodular by Assumption C, from 
Topkis (1978) we know that v is weakly increasing with d.  Thus, (7) implies R(S
d) is 
increasing in d. 
STEP 1B:  R supports an equilibrium in the unrestricted auction. 
Consider any deviation to a debt contract.  From Step 1a, the probability of winning the 
auction is the same as in a first-price auction.  Since we have a first-price equilibrium, 
there is no gain to the deviation. 
Consider a deviation to a non-debt contract S.  To show it is not profitable for any type, 
we must show that P(R(S)) ≤ minv B(S,v).  Let v be the highest type in the set that 
minimizes B(S,v).  Then ES(v) ≥ R(S).  It is sufficient to show that type v does not find 
the deviation to S profitable; i.e. to show that P(R(S)) ≤ B(S,v). 
Find d such that ES
d(v) = ES(v).   Then B(S
d,v) = B(S,v).  From Lemma 5, types v′ < v find 
S
d more expensive than S, so that B(S
d,v′)  >  B(S,v′)  ≥  B(S,v).  Therefore, 
' argmin ( , ')
d
v B Sv v ≥ , and so from (7), 
  R(S
d) ≥ ES
d(v) ≥ R(S). 
Thus, if a deviation to S is profitable, so is a deviation to S
d.  But this contradicts the fact 
that no deviation to a debt contract is profitable. 
STEP 2:  A symmetric D1 equilibrium in the unrestricted auction has the same payoffs as 
the equilibrium of a first-price debt auction. 
Our method of proof is to show that any non-debt bids can be replaced with an equivalent 
debt bid without changing the equilibrium.   
STEP 2A:  If S is not a debt contract, then at most one type uses this security. 
Suppose not, so that v1 < v2 are the lowest and highest types that use S.  Then, by (5), R(S) 
= ES(v
∗) for some v1 < v
∗ < v2.  Consider the debt contract S
d with the same cost for type 
v
∗; i.e. such that ES
d(v
∗) = ES(v
∗).   From Lemma 5,  types v < v
∗ find the S
d more 
expensive than S, so that B(S
d, v) > P(R(S)).  Therefore, 
* argmin ( , )
d




∗) = R(S).  But this contradicts an equilibrium, as type v2 finds S
d 
strictly cheaper than S with a weakly higher score. 
STEP 2B:  Suppose type v uses contract S, and define d(v) as the debt level that for type v 
has equal cost; i.e.,  ES
d(v)(v) = ES(v).  Then bidding S
d(v) has the same payoff as bidding 
S, and so S
d(v) is also optimal for type v. 
Because S is an equilibrium bid, P(R(S
d(v))) ≤ P(R(S)) by (6).  However, by the same 
argument used in the previous step, lower types find S
d(v) more costly than S so that    33
B(S
d(v), v′) > P(R(S)) for v′ < v.  Hence R(S
d(v)) ≥ ES
d(v)(v) = R(S).  Thus, P(R(S
d(v))) = 
P(R(S)).  The result follows since the cost and probability of acceptance of bidding debt 
with face value d(v) and bidding S are the same for type v. 
STEP 2C:  d(v) is the unique symmetric equilibrium for a first-price auction restricted to 
debt and it is increasing.     
From Step 2b, bidding debt d(v) is optimal and so solves 
() () ( ) ( ( ))( ( )) max ( ( ))( ( ))
dv dv d d
d Uv PRS v E S v PRS v E S v =− = − . 
Using the same logic as in step 1a, R(S
d) is increasing in d.  Therefore, this maximization 
problem is identical to the problem faced by bidders in a debt-only first-price auction. 
Uniqueness and monotinicity follow from Lemma 3.    
STEP 3:  In a symmetric D1 equilibrium in the unrestricted auction, almost every bid is a 
debt contract.  
From Step 2 and Lemma 3, the equilibrium payoff of type v in the first-price auction with 
debt is  
  U(v) = F
n−1(v) (v − ES
d(v)(v)), 
and so U is differentiable.  Suppose type v ∈ (vL, vH) bids S in equilibrium.  Then by a 
standard envelope argument,  
  U′(v) = F
n−1(v)(1 − ES′(v)). 
Thus, ES(v) = ES
d(v)(v) and ES′(v) = ES
d(v)′(v).  Therefore by Lemma 5, S = S
d(v).     
PROOF OF PROPOSITION VI:   
Case 1:  First and Second-Price Auctions 
Let s′ be a bid that wins with positive probability such that S(s′,0) < 0.  Then, due to the 
moral hazard problem, submitting this bid earns strictly positive profits for any type, 
since any type can simply not invest and collect −S(s′,0) in a first-price auction, or even 
more in a second-price auction (since the second highest bid is below s′).  Thus, by 
incentive compatibility, all equilibrium bids earn positive profits. 
Let s be the lowest bid submitted.  Then the above implies this bid must win with positive 
probability.  Since it is the lowest bid, this implies a tie -- that is, s is submitted with 
positive probability.  But then raising the bid slightly would lead to a discrete jump in the 
probability of winning and hence in profits. 
Incentive compatibility therefore implies s = s1, the highest possible bid.  If S(s1,0) ≥ 0, 
this contradicts the existence of s′.  If S(s1,0) < 0, then all types bid s1.  But at s1, all types 
lose money if they run the project.  Therefore, all types bid s1, do not invest, and collect 
−S(s1, 0) > 0 from the seller. 
Case 2:  General Mechanisms 
In an efficient mechanism, the lowest type wins with zero probability and so earns zero 
expected profits.  Since lowest type can claim to be any type and not invest, it must be the   34
case that no type with positive probability of winning pays a security with S(0) < 0 with 
positive probability. 
Case 3:  Informal Auctions 
Here the result follows immediately from our result that an equilibrium will always use 
the flattest possible securities.  If S(0) < 0, we can “flatten” the security by raising S(0) 
and flattening it elsewhere.    
PROOF OF RESULTS IN SECTION 5.3:   
Result 1:  Consider a first-price auction and two sets of securities A and B where A is 
steeper than B.  Let 
A
v S  and 
B
v S  be the equilibrium bid for type v using these two sets.  
Consider the expected payments of a type v who bids as type v′: 
 
*
' (,' ) ( ) , '
jj
vi i i M vv E S Z V vV v − ⎡⎤ == ≤ ⎣⎦   for j = A, B. 
Suppose ( , ) ( , )
AB M vv M vv = .  Given affiliation, a direct generalization of Lemma 5 
implies that  11 (,) (,)
AB M vv M vv > .  The conclusion then follows from the same linkage 
principle argument as in the proof of Proposition I. 
Now consider a second-price auction.  The equilibrium bid satisfies the zero profit 
condition: 
 
** () , ,
j
vi i i i i i ES Z V v V v EZ XV v V v −− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ == =− == ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
The proof follows the same logic as in Proposition I; the seller’s revenues depend on the 




12 22 () , () ,
jj
vi i i vi i i ES Z V vV v ES Z V vV v −− ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ == − == ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦  
Again, affiliation implies this difference will be larger for steeper securities. 
Result 2:  Consider a set A of securities that is convex or sub-convex.  Let 
j
v S  be the bid 
of type v in a j-price auction.  The expected payment for type v who bids as v′ in a first-
price auction is 
 
11 *1
'' ( , ' ) () , ' () vi i i vi i M vv E S Z V vV v E S Z V v − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ == ≤ == ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  




,' ( , ' ) () , ' ()
i ii i v v ii V M vv E S Z V vV v E S Z V v
− − ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ == ≤ == ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦  
where  *
22 *
,' () () , '
i vv i i V SzE Sz Vv Vv
− − ⎡⎤ == ≤ ⎣⎦  for all z; the security 
2
,' vv S is in the convex hull 
of A.  Suppose M
1(v,v) = M
2(v,v).  To apply the linkage principle, we must show that 
12
11 (,) (,) M vv M vv < .  But this follows since (i) 
2
, vv S  is in the convex hull of A and   35
therefore is steeper than 
1
v S , and (ii) affiliation and the monotonicity of bids implies that 
2
,' () ' ' vv i i E SZVv ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦  is increasing in v. 
Result 3:  Let  ( )
j v α  be the equity bid of type v in a j-price auction.  Then 
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where the inequality follows since 
2* () i V− α  and Z are positively correlated, and we use the 
fact that types are independent.  Therefore, M
1(v,v') = M
2(v,v') implies that  
 
12 * * (' ) ( ) ' ii vE V Vv −− ⎡⎤ α> α ≤ ⎣⎦  
But since  l l E ZV V = ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ∑ ,  
 
11 2 2 * *
11 (,' ) (' ) (,' ) ( ) , ' ii i M vv v M vv E V V vV v −− ⎡ ⎤ =α > = α = ≤ ⎣ ⎦ 
Thus, the result follows from the linkage principle. 
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